Short Communication: DEA based auctions by Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Short Communication: DEA based
auctions
A. Papakonstantinou and P. Bogetoft
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43564/
MPRA Paper No. 43564, posted 5 January 2013 03:14 UTC
Short Communication: DEA based auctions
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Peter Bogetoft
Copenhagen Business School
Department of Economics, Denmark
Abstract
In this paper we introduce a simulation framework which we use to numerically
evaluate the Hybrid DEA - Second Score Auction. In a procurement setting, the
winner of the Hybrid auction by design receives payment at the most equal to the
second score auction. It is therefore superior to the traditional second score scheme
from the point of view of a principal interested in acquiring an item at the minimum
price without losing in quality. For a set of parameters we quantify the size of the
improvements. We show in particular that the improvement depends intimately
on the regularity imposed on the underlying cost function. In the least structured
case of a variable returns to scale technology, the hybrid auction only improved
the outcome for a small percentage of cases. However, for those few cases the
improvement introduced by the hybrid auction is significant. For other technologies
with constant returns to scale, the gains are considerably higher and payments are
lowered in a large percentage of cases. In the simulations, we furthermore calculate
the effect of the number of the participating agents, the concavity of the principal
value functions, and the number of quality dimensions.
1 Introduction
The DEA - Second Score Hybrid auction introduced in the article entitled ’DEA based
auctions’ (see [1]) is qualitatively superior to the traditional Second Score Auction [2]
(SSA). It shares the properties of being individually rational, incentive compatible and
socially optimal (allocatively efficient) with the SSA and at the same time, it may lower
the costs to the procuring principal. The lower payment is made possible by exploiting
the correlations or affiliations among the costs of the different agents.
In practice, however, the qualitative improvements over the SSA may not justify the
added complexity of using a hybrid DEA-SSA auction. The quantitative improvements
must be significant as well.
In this paper, we therefore introduce a framework for the simulation of such auctions
and we compare the payment the winner of a hybrid auction receives to that of the winner
of the standard second score auction. Moreover, we examine how payments are affected
by the assumed cost regularities, the number of agents participating in the auctions, the
concavity of the principal’s value function and the agents’ quality dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyse the DEA - Second
Score hybrid auction, while giving some background in multi-dimensional auctions and
DEA. In Section 3 we introduce the simulation framework and specifically the parameter
1
spaces while we define the objectives of the simulations. In Section 4 we present the
numerical results. In the first set of simulations, we analyse the Hybrid auction for
single-dimensional quality (output) and compare Hybrid auction’s payments under the
use of VRS and CRS DEA technologies with the second score action. In the second set of
simulations, we perform a similar analysis of the Hybrid auction but for a case of three-
dimensional qualities. Finally in Section 5 we analyse our findings and draw conclusions
as to their effects on the practical applications of hybrid auctions.
2 The DEA - Second Score Hybrid auction
The Hybrid auction introduces weak structure in the costs of producing different outputs.
We consider a setting where different agents can produce different outputs at costs which
are consistent with some underlying but unknown cost function. This cost function
belongs to a broad class of cost functions, e.g. the set of all increasing and convex cost
functions.
The Hybrid auction works by first assigning scores to the cost-output bids submitted
by the agents. These scores are used to identify the agent with the highest potential to
contribute to social welfare. That agent wins the auction and its payment is set to the
minimum of the second-score payment and the DEA yardstick cost, based solely on the
bids from other bidders.
To formalise, let us introduce a minimum of notation. Let the set of bidders be I, and
let the output profile offered by bidder i be denote yi. Also, let his reported, possibly
manipulated cost be denoted xi. The value function measuring the principal’s benefit
from different output profiles are denoted as V (·). Lastly, let the DEA estimated cost
function based on all bids but the bid of bidder i be denoted CDEA−i(·; k) where k is a
parameter defining the DEA model used. In the k = VRS case,
CDEA−i(y;V RS) = min{
∑
j 6=i
λjxj : y ≤
∑
j 6=i
λjyj,
∑
j 6=i
λj = 1}
where the last restriction is eliminated in the case of CRS.
The DEA - Second Score Hybrid auction runs as follow:
Step 1: The bidders submit price-output bids (xi, yi), i ∈ I.
Step 2: Each bid is assigned a score Si = S(xi, yi) = V (yi)− xi, i ∈ I.
Step 3: The bid with the highest score wins, i.e. ignoring ties, the project is allocated to
agent i when Si = S(1)
Step 4: The winner i is compensated with
bi(x, y) = min{CDEA−i(yi; k), V (yi)− S(2)}
and losers are not compensated
In this outline, S(1) is the highest value of Si, i ∈ I and S(2) is the second highest value
of Sii ∈ I
2
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the Hybrid auction.
In Figure 1 we provide the intuition behind the auction through a simple example.
Assuming the use of VRS technology, the winner of the auction, agent 1, is paid a convex
combination of agents’ 2 and 3 bids.
For ease of future reference, let us call b above the Hybrid k payment, V (yi) − S(2)
the SSA payment and CDEA−i(yi; k) the DEA k payment.
Like in the second score auction an agent’s bid affects its chance of being selected, but
not the compensation when it is selected. This is the key to the incentive compatibility.
In addition to this, the use of benchmarking undermines the bidders’ advantage of having
private cost information. Through the use of a DEA model the equivalent of a second
price outcome can be determined in contexts where the service bundles (i.e. the qualities
or the outputs) offered by the different bidders are not entirely similar.
3 Simulation Framework
Based on the Hybrid auction described in the previous section we now introduce the
simulation framework. We consider a specific scenario in which the principal’s concave
value function is given by V (y) = 4(1 − e−αy) and the agents’ cost function is given by
x(y) = cy2 for the VRS technology and x(y) = cy for the CRS technology. The parameter
c represents the agents’ private information of their common unit costs and is indepen-
dently drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 1). We will introduce multi-dimensional
generalisations below. The value function has constant Arrow-Pratt coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion r(y) = −V ′′(y)/V ′(y) = α, and the more risk-averse the principal, the
more convex (curved) is the value function, cf. eg. [3]. Lastly, the output level, often
interpreted as the agents’ quality level, is drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 2).
In a given iteration, all agents face an underlying cost function of the same form, but
their output levels and cost parameters differ.
We simulate the mechanism 104 times for a range of 3 to 60 agents. In every iteration
we simulate the agents’ costs and qualities (randomly drawn c and y), perform the se-
lection of the agent with the highest score and record the payment it receives for Hybrid
auctions using the VRS, and CRS DEA technologies and the second score auction. Due
to the number of iterations we perform, the standard error in the mean values plotted is
smaller than the symbol size in the plot (less than 10−3) and thus we omit it for clarity.
Based on the above setting, we perform two sets of simulations. In the first set we
examine the effect the concavity of the principal’s value function has on the winner’s
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payment (results detailed in plots in Figures 2 and 3), while in the second set we consider
multi-dimensional qualities (Figure 4). In both simulations we also explore the payments’
sensitivity to the number of agents participating in the auction.
Technically, all simulations are done in R and all DEA programs are solved using the
”Benchmarking” package for R, cf. [4] and [5]
4 Simulation Results
Having detailed the simulation’s input parameters and objectives, we now present our
numerical findings. The most notable result for both cases (single and multi-dimensional
qualities) is that the expected payment for the winning agent depends intimately on the
assumed regularity of the underlying cost function. With the least ex ante assumptions,
in the Hybrid VRS auction, the payment is the same or almost identical to the second
score auction. For the Hybrid CRS auction though, the payment is significantly less than
the second score auction. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 (Plots a and b) for the
single-dimensional quality and in Figure 4 (Plots a and b) for the multi-dimension quality.
In the following sections we look at each case in greater detail and provide the intuition
behind the main result.
4.1 Single-dimension output
Initially we fix the concavity of the principal’s value function by α = 1 and compare the
payment the winner expects to derive in the Hybrid k auction (min{CDEA−i(yi; k), V (yi)−
S(2)}) with the second score auction (V (yi)−S(2)) as the number of agents increases from
3 to 60. First, we use VRS technology (k=VRS) and simulate the costs using a quadratic
cost function, while we then proceed to use the CRS technology (k=CRS), with costs
being simulated by a linear cost function x(y) = cy. We show that as the number of
agents increases the winner’s average Hybrid VRS payment is almost equal to the second
score auction payment (Figure 2 : Plot a), with the ratio between Hybrid VRS and SSA
ranging from 0.98 to 0.99. For its liner cost counterparts, the Hybrid CRS payment is
significantly lower than the expected payment in the second score auction (Figure 2: Plot
b) with the ratio ranging from 0.6 to 0.27.
We proceed to study the Hybrid VRS auction in more detail by showing in Figure
2 : Plot c that for 82.9% to 92.25% of the iterations of the algorithm, the second score
payment V (yi)−S(2) is lower than the DEA VRS payment CDEA−i(yi; k) (with k=VRS).
Also, the simulations showed that hyper-efficiency, i.e. the possibility of VRS being
unable to provide a cost norm, has no significant effects despite its dominance in the
cases with few agents (in 53.45% and 42.60% of the iterations for 3 and 4 agents the
winner is hyper-efficient and only for 8.54% of the iterations for 60 agents). Now given
that in the Hybrid auction the winner receives the DEA based payment only if it is less
than the second score payment, these results suggest that the VRS technology introduces
an improvement, albeit not a significant one, for that specific value of the parameter α,
since for the vast majority of the cases the Hybrid VRS auction payment to the winner
is equal to the second score auction. On the contrary, for the Hybrid CRS auction
the percentage of cases whereby the second score payment is lower than the DEA CRS
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Figure 2: Single dimensional qualities for n = {3, ..., 60} agents, α = 1, c ∼ U(0, 1), and
y ∼ U(0, 2).
payment decreases from 39.6% to 15.2% as the number of agents increases to 60 (Figure
2 : Plot d), with hyper-efficiency non existing.
For the second part of these simulations we fix the number of participating agents
to 60 and begin to examine the dependence of the expected payments on the concavity
of the principal’s value function. We measure the concavity, based on the Arrow-Pratt
coefficient which for the particular value function used in these simulations is equal to
α. We follow an identical process by plotting the expected payments for the winners of
both VRS and CRS Hybrid auctions and second score auctions (Figure 3: Plots a and b)
for α in {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.4...5} and then the percentage of occurrences of
the second score payment being lower than the DEA VRS and CRS payments (Figure 3:
Plots c and d).
In more detail, in Figure 3 : Plot a we show that, as in the previous simulations,
the average Hybrid VRS payment is very close to the second score auction payment,
while for linear costs, the average SSA payment is again higher than the average Hybrid
CRS payment. However, as opposed to previous simulations, there is a clear indication
that as α increases, average Hybrid VRS payment is in-fact less than the average second
score payment. The intuition behind this result, is that as the principal’s risk aversion
increases, the utility function becomes more and more curved in (0, 2] (the space of agents’
qualities). Consequently, the score function gets less power since it will tend to envelop
the points less closely. A secondary result is that all (second score and both Hybrid
auctions) average payments decrease as the parameter α increases for α >= 0.7. This
is to be expected, since a heavy risk averse principal (high value of parameter α), will
favour lower qualities which result in lower payments.
Finally, regarding the occurrence of cases in which the SSA payment is less than the
VRS DEA payment, the decrease is almost linear as the parameter α increases (Figure 3
: Plot c), while for the linear cost functions the occurrence of cases where SSA payment
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Figure 3: Single dimensional qualities for α = {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.4...5} and
n = 60 agents.
is less than the CRS DEA payment increases as the parameter increases (Figure 3 : Plot
d). Both results justify our initial findings since the increase of the gap between the SSA
and Hybrid VRS payment suggests that the number of cases where the Hybrid auction
payment is equal to the second score one decreases, while exactly the opposite happens for
the Hybrid CRS payment which becomes more equal to the second score as α increases.
4.2 Multi-dimensional output
In this set of simulations we consider three dimensional qualities, hence we adjust the
principal’s value function to V (y) = 4(3 − ea1y1 − ea2y2 − ea3y3) with y1, y2, y3 ∼ U(0, 2).
Likewise, we adjust the agents’ cost functions to x(y) = c1y
2
1 +c2y
2
2 +c3y
2
3 in the quadratic
case and to x(y) = c1y1 + c2y2 + c3y3 in the linear case, with c1, c2, c3 ∈ (0, 1].
We follow a similar process to the one for single-dimension qualities and calculate
the payment the winner gets in the second score auction and the Hybrid VRS and CRS
auctions (Figure 4 : Plot a and b), with the number of the participating agents varying
from 3 to 60. In terms of the ordering of the average payments we receive similar results
as in the first set of simulations. In addition to that, the appearance of a hyper-efficient
winner almost follows the pattern of the single-dimensional simulations i.e. for the Hybrid
VRS there is a hyper-efficient winner at 87.5% and 81.9% of the iterations for 3 and 4
agents and 33.8% for 60 agents.
In the single-dimension counterparts the occurrences of the cases where the SSA
payment is lower than the DEA VRS payment decreased monotonically with the number
of agents. In the multiple dimension case, this does not happen, cf. Figure 4 : Plot c
(monotonicity exists for the percentage of SSA payment less than he DEA CRS ones cf.
Figure 4 : Plot d).
Finally, for any auction the expected payment to the winner is higher in the multi-
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Figure 4: Multi dimensional qualities for n = {3, ..., 60} agents, α1 = α2 = α3 = 1 and
c1, c2, c3 ∼ U(0, 1).
dimensional case than in the single-dimensional case. Indeed, the introduction of 3 di-
mensions results in an increase of the average second score payments in a range of 2.48
to 5 times higher than the single-dimensional case for 3 to 60 agents. The same pattern
appears for the linear cost case, where that ration is ranging from 2.8 to 7.4.
5 Conclusions
To sum up, we have shown that for both single and multi dimensional qualities, the
use of a combination of benchmarking and second score thinking lowers the expected
payment to the providers, and more so, the stronger assumptions (linear, quadratic) we
impose on the underlying cost function. The VRS DEA technology does not provide
a significant increase in the efficiency of the second score multi-dimensional auction on
behalf of the principal since it results in almost identical payments to the winner. Indeed,
for the few iterations in which it is preferable for the principal to select the DEA payment
over the second score payment, there is a small improvement. This is highlighted in the
single-dimensional qualities simulations, where the ratio between the Hybrid VRS and
the second score average payment is always less but very close to 1, and the Hybrid
VRS payment is equal to the second score one for 82.9% to 95.25% of the simulation’s
iterations. This suggests that the relative small number of iterations in which the DEA
VRS payment is less than the second score payment is enough to push the average ratio
of Hybrid VRS to SSA below 1.
In addition to that, we showed that the ability of the score function to limit payments
to the provider depends on the concavity of the score function. As the principal’s utility
function gets more concave, i.e. as he gets more risk averse with a higher value of α, the
role of the DEA benchmarks becomes more important. The intuition is that the more
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curved score function gives a score based approximation more similar to the DEA FDH
model where we only impose free disposability of inputs and outputs.
We also showed how the number of bidding agents impact the outcome. In general,
more agents will make both the SSA and the DEA based payments lower. In particular
for a low number of bidders, extra bidders will have a large marginal impact on the
payments. This suggests that the procuring principal should make an effort to engage
more bidders.
Lastly, we showed that the introduction of additional output / quality dimensions
significantly increases the expected payment. We are aware that this may not be a
surprising result since now the average costs and principal’s value function are higher
from the single-dimension case since three outputs are produced. However, this increase
can be also be attributed to fact than now the ability of DEA to approximate the cost
function and the power of the the second score principle to limit the payments are both
undermined by the extra dimensions. That is, with more dimensions quite a few extra
bidders are needed in order to span the cost function with a given precision. This suggests
that the principal should think carefully on which qualities really matter with an attempt
to limit these effects.
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